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One of the most critical planning activities of many businesses is
bidding for the opportunity to provide a product or service. The very
existence of many firms is dependent upon a bidding strategy that obtains
both jobs and profits. Recently, in an attempt to improve their bidding
practices, a number of firms have employed probabilistic bidding models.
Such models assist the decision maker in arriving at a bid price that
has the optimal combination of probability of acceptance and profit if
accepted.
A survey, published in 1969, revealed that firms making use of
probabilistic bidding models have a better record of successful bids than
those that do not. Yet, despite the importance of bidding and despite
the favorable results obtained with probabilistic bidding models, the same
survey also revealed that only one -third of the firms engaged in com-
petitive bidding use such models.
There are at least two major reasons why probabilistic bidding models
are not more widely used. First, the topic is a new one. More than one-
2
half of the articles written on bidding have appeared since 1965. Second,
most of these articles have either been too specific" or too esoteric to
appear widely useful and/cr useable. This paper is an attempt to pull
together the important aspects of probabilistic bidding into one coherent,
intelligible model. Except where otherwise indicated it is assumed that
the objective of management is to maximize profits.
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BASIC MODEL
The underlying relationships in all probabilistic bidding models are
between the size of the bid, the expected profit if the bid is accepted,
and the probability of the bids being accepted. High bids, with a large
expected profit if accepted, have a low probability of being accepted in
competitive situations. Conversely, low bids, which have a high probability
of being accepted, offer little or no profit. The basic objective of
probabilistic bidding models is to find the optimum combination of profit
if accepted and probability of acceptance. The optimum bid is the one that
offers the highest expected profit. In mathematical notation the optimum
bid is the one that maximizes the following equation:
E(X) = P(X)Z (1)
where
:
X = amount of the bid;
2 = expected profit if accepted;
P(X) = probability of a biH of X being accepted; and
E(X) « expected profit of a bid of X.
In equation 1 the expected profit equals the probability of winning
with a bid of X multiplied by the profit associated with that bid. The
basic problem in implementing probabilistic bidding models, such as the one
represented by equation 1, is estimating the probability of a bid being
accepted. In the absence of purchaser bias, this problem is one of esti-
mating the probability of a bids being the lowest one submitted. This
probability can be mathematically estimated subject to two assumptions:
(1) competitor's estimates of direct costs bear a constant relationship
to the bidder's estimates of direct costs; and (2) competitors will act
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in the future as they have in the past.
The first assumption is reasonable if labor and material cost
estimates of competing firms are consistently accurate (or inaccurate)
and if labor and material costs are not subject to wide flucuations
across geographic areas. The second assumption may not hold over ex-
tended periods of time if competitors respond to the bidders behavior.
Other factors, such as seasonal variations in work loads, may also weaken
the second assumption. Several of these factors will be considered later.
To demonstrate the basic model, use is made of two hypothetical
competitors. The ABC company is considering bidding on a project against
one known competitor, the XYZ company. Because the contract will be
awarded to the lowest bidder, ABC wishes to determine the probability that
its bid will be lower than XYZ's bid. The first step in doing this is to
obtain information on previous relationships between ABC's estimated
direct cost and XYZ's bid on similar projects. This is done in Table 1.
The second step is to analyze the data in Table 1 to determine the pro-
bability of XYZ's submitting a bid higher than any given percent of ABC's
estimated direct cost. The result of this analysis is presented in
Table 2 and Figure 1.
Because the contract will be awarded to the lowest bidder, the
probability that XYZ will submit a bid higher than any given percent of
ABC's estimated direct cost is also the probability that ABC will be awarded
the contract when a contemplated bid is stated in terms of a percent of
estimated direct costs. Accordingly, the probability that a bid will be
successful can be readily determined from Table 2 or Figure 1. If ABC

-4-
TABlE 1
Relationship of XYZ's Bids to ABC's Estimated Direct Costs
ABC's ABC's
Estimated Estimated
XYZ's Direct XYZ's Direct
Project Bid Cost Percent Project Bid Cost Percent
1 19,800 15,000 132 11 29,700 22,000 135
2 88,400 65,000 136 12 60,900 42,000 145
3 62,800 40,000 157 13 39,900 30,000 133
4 33,750 25,000 135 14 29,800 20,000 149
5 72,500 50,000 145 15 23,250 15,000 155
6 11,100 10,000 111 16 34,440 21,000 164
7 64,860 47,000 138 17 47,520 36,000 132
8 12,080 8,000 151 18 43,200 30,000 144
9 53,760 32,000 168 19 41,160 28,000 147
10 99,<00 70,000 142 20 73,750 59,000 125
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TABLE 2
Probability of Underbidding One Known Competitor
Bid as a Percent
of Estimated Direct Cost
Number of
Higher Bids
Percent Higher
(Probability
of Underbidding)
110 20 100
115 19 .95
120 19 .95
125 19 .95
130 18 .90
135 15 .75
140 11 .55
145 9 .45
150 6 .30
155 4 .20
160 2 .10
165 1 .05
170 .00
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FIGURE 1
Probability of Underbidding One Known Competitor
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submits a bid of 140 percent of estimated direct costs, Table 2 and Figure
1 indicate there is a 55 percent probability that such a bid will be lower
than XYZ's bid. If ABC submits a bid of 110 percent of estimated direct
costs it is almost certain that their bid will be lower than XYZ's. However,
a bid of 110 percent of estimated direct costs provides for little contri-
bution to profit and overhead. The relationship between the size of the
bid as a percent of estimated direct costs and the contribution margin as
a percent of the bid is shown in Figure 2.
It was previously stated that the optimum bid is the one that offers
the highest expected profit. Because the model only considers direct
costs, the operational definition of the optimum bid must be restated. The
optimum bid is the one that offers the highest expected contribution to
profit and overhead . The expected contribution margin of a bid is deter-
mined by multiplying the difference between the bid price and estimated
direct costs by the probability that the bid will be accepted. To determine
the optimum bid, the contribution margin or contribution margin percent on
each bid under consideration must be ultiplied by the probability of the
bids being lower than a competitors.
For example, ABC is considering bids of 130, 140, and 150 percent of
estimated direct costs. Using the information in Figure 2 and Table 2, the
expected contribution margin percents of these bids are computed as follows:
(.23) (.90) .21 for 130 percent
(.29) (.55) = .16 for 140 percent
(.33) (.30) « .10 for 150 percent
A bid of 130 percent of estimated direct costs has the highest expected
contribution margin percent. It is the optimum bid. The expected contribution

8-
FIG'IE 2
Relation Between Size of Bid and Contribution Margin
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margin percents on other possible bids are shown in Table 3 and Figure 3.
Several Known Competitors
Thus far consideration has been given to a situation in which the
bidder has only one known competitor and no capacity constraints. A
bidder usually has several known or unknown competitors and he may have
capacity limitations. The model can be extended to these situations.
First, consider the case where there are several known competitors.
Here, an analysis is made of the historic relationship of each competitor's
bids to estimated direct costs. Then, the probability of each competitor
submitting a bid higher than any given percent of estimated direct cost
can be computed as was done for the XYZ company in Table 2. Finally,
the overall probability of underbidding all competitors and the expected
contribution margin percent of a given bid can be determined.
For example, assume the ABC company is considering bidding on a con-
tract against three known competitors: DEF, TUV, and XYZ. After analyzing
the past bids of these three competitors, the probability of underbidding
each one when the bid is expressed as a percent of estimated direct costs
is determined. These probabilities are shown in Table 4. Next, the
probability of underbidding all three is determined by multiplying the
probabilities of underbidding each one. A bid of 140 percent of estimated
direct costs has an 80 percent probability of being lower than DEF's bid,
a 50 percent probability of being lower than TUV's bid, and a 55 percent
probability of being lower than XYZ's bid, but only a 22 percent (.80 •
.50 • .55) probability of being lower than all three bids. Finally, the
expected contribution margin percent of a bid is computed by multiplying
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TABL^ 3
Expected Contribution Margin Percent When Bidding
Against the XY2 Company
Bid as a
Percent of Estimated
Direct Cost
Contribution
Margin Percent
9
Probability
of
Acceptance
1.00
Ex
Cont
Margi
pected
ribution
n Percent
110 9
120 17 .95 16
130* 23 .90 21*
140 29 .55 16
150 33 .30 10
160 38 .10 4
170 41 .00
* Optimal Bid

-11-
FIGULd 3
Expected Contribution Margin Percent When Bidding
Against the XYZ Company
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TABL: 4
Probability of Underbidding Three Known Competitors
Bid as a Percent Probabil:Lty of Underbidding Overal
1
of Estimated Probability
Direct Costs DEF TUV XYZ of Underbidding
110 1.00 .98 1.00 .980
120 .98 .90 .95 .838
130 ,95 .85 ,90 .727
140 .80 .50 .55 .220
150 .40 .25 .30 .030
160 .20 .05 .10 .001
170 .05 .00 .00 .000
TABLE 5
Expected Contribution Margin Percent When Bidding
Against Three Known Competitors
Bid as a Probability Expected
Percent of Estimated Contribute i of Contribution
Direct Cost Margin Percent
9
Acceptancy
.980
Margin Percent
110 .0882
120 17 .838 .1425
130* 23 .727 .1672*
140 29 .220 .0638
150 33 .030 .0099
160 38 .001 .0004
170 41 .000 .0000
•Optimal Bid
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the probability of the bids being accepted by the contribution margin
percent provided by the bid. A bid of 140 percent of estimated direct
costs has a 22 percent probability of being accepted and provides for a
contribution margin of 29 percent. Accordingly, the expected contribution
margin percent of such a bid is 6.38 percent (.20 • .29). Other values
are shown in Table 5. Once again the optimum bid is 130 percent of
estimated direct costs. It appears that as the number of competitors
increases the probability of a given bid being accepted decreases. However,
the optimum bid does not necessarily decrease as the number of competitors
increases.
One or More Unknown Competitors
The second extension of the model considers the frequently en-
countered situation where either the identity or the number of bidders are
unknown. One approach to this situation is to employ the concept of an
"average" bidder. Past experience and judgement are used to determine
the probability of a given bid being lower than that submitted by an
average bidder. The probability of a given bid being lower than all of
those submitted by n average bidders is computed by raising the above
probability to the nth power. For example , if XYZ is believed to be an
average bidder and there are three unknown bidders the probability of a
bid of 130 percent of estimated direct costs being lower than all other
bids is (.90) 3 or 72.9 percent.
In the absence of capacity considerations, which will be discussed
later, the optimum bid will not be affected by the number of average bidders,
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although the expected contribution margin of the bid will be. This is
demonstrated in Table 6. Accordingly , in determining the optimal bid,
it is not necessary to know the number of bidders if a profile of the
average bidder can be determined.
When the number of bidders is large, the probability of a given
bid being accepted can also be estimated by analyzing the relationship
between the size of past winning bids and estimated direct costs. This
procedure has fairly limited data requirements. The results of its use
will be satisfactory if the number of bidders on the type of project
being considered was large in the past and is expected to be large in
the future.
However, neither the use of the concept of an average bidder, nor
the use of probabilities based on past winning bids, is recommended when
there are a few known competitors. In this case, knowledge of the bidding
profile of a particular bidder may significantly affect the probability
of a given bid being accepted,, and the optimum bid.
Capacity Constraints
The final extension of the basic model that will be considered in
detail is that of capacity limitations. It may happen that a bidder
following a strategy of profit maximization is fortunate enough to find
that he is being awarded more contracts than he has capacity to fill. In
such circumstances, he could increase his profits by submitting higher bids
Although he would receive fewer contracts, he would earn a higher profit
on each one.
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For example, assume the ABC company has been maximizing its expected
contribution margin when bidding against companies DEF., TUV, and XYZ by
constantly bidding 130 percent of estimated direct costs. Further,
assume that all of the contracts being bid on are of approximately equal
size, that the contracts cannot be subcontracted, and that capacity can-
not be expanded in the short run. Following this strategy, ABC has been
winning 72 ' percent of the contracts it has bid on, Because ABC only
has enou^.n capacity to fill 22 percent of the available projects a back-
log has built up. ABC can operate at full capacity and increase the profit
it earns on each contract won by submitting bids of 140 percent of estimated
direct costs. This is shown in Table 4.
Conversely, if a bidder is temporarily operating below capacity
because of seasonal fluctuations or other factors, he may consider
sacrificing profits to keep his workforce employed. The bidding strategy
necessary to do this can be easily determined once the bidder estimates
the portion of the available contracts he must obtain to operate at full
capacity. Ultimately, he may decide not to operate at full capacity
after comparing the costs of an idle workforce with the eonomic sacrifice
required to keep them employed. However, he will have better information
available on which to base his decision.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Despite the neatness of the foregoing analysis, probabilistic bidding
models do not eliminate the need for professional judgment. Such models
are merely one source of information available to help the decision maker.
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Many other factors, some quantifiable and some nonquantifiable , must also
be taken into consideration.
Consideration should be given to seasonal fluctuations in the number
of projects available to be bid on and the number of bidders. The results
of a recent study show that in the construction industry the largest
number of contracts are let in the spring and summer and the fewest
number of contracts are let in the late fall and winter. Conversely, the
average number of bidder? per contract was lowest in the spring and summer
and highest in the late fall and winter. As might be expected, the bids
as a percent of estimated direct cost, were highest in the spring and
3
summer and lowest in the late fall and winter. The fluctuations in bids
as a percent of estimated direct costs, appear to be a function of the
amount of capacity bidders have available. Bidding models for industries
that display seasonal fluctuations in bids as a percent of estimated
4
direct costs must be modified to take such fluctuation into account.
In addition to seasonal fluctuations in bids, other knowledge of a
competitors current condition might -ffect the optimum bid. If a com-
petitor has just been awarded a large contract, be may be less eager to
receive a subsequent one and either not bid, or submit a high bid. If
it is anticipated that he will intentionally submit a high bid, he can
be eliminated from the list of competitors.
In the construction industry, some consideration must be given to
the proximity of the project being bid on to other projects currently
underway. If a competitor has a nearby project, his estimate of direct
costs may not bear the same relationship to the bidders estimate of direct
costs as it has in the past. This is due to lower transportation costs
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for equipment and the potential for more effective utilisation of personnel.
Consideration should also be given to the accuracy of cost estimates.
If little confidence is placed in the accuracy of cost estimates, it may
be desirable to submit a higher bid than would be indicated by the model
in order to reduce the chance of incurring a loss. A number of writers
have previously considered uncertainty in cost estimates.
Data requirements may severly limit the usefulness of the model. Lists
of prospective bidders and bid results may be obtained from the architect
or engineer for a project or from the local construction newspaper. In
other cases, bid results can be obtained at the bid opening. The Commerce
^
Business Daily^ published by the U.S. Department of Commerce, contains a
daily list, of contract awards by the U.S. government. However, the data
required to use a probabilistic bidding model may not be available in all
industries, and in those in which it is available, a considerable period
of time will pass before sufficient data can be accumulated to use the model
SUMMARY
This paper hi tempted to synthesize the important aspects of
probabilistic bide.' '.els. Such mode he decision maker in
arriving ac i bid prir as the optimal combination of profit if
accepted and probability o: tance. In the past, firms making use
of probabilistic bidding models have had a better record of successful
bids than those that did not. It is worth emphasizing that probabilistic
bidding models, like other quantitative techniques, cannot replace the
professional judgment of a decision maker. They are merely one source of
useful information.
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FOOTNOTES
*S. Paranka, "The Pay-off Concept In Competitive Bidding," Business
Horizons (August, 1969), pp. 79-80.
2r. Stark, ''Competitive Bidding: A Comprehensive Bibliography,"
Operations Research (March-April, 1971), p. 484.
3J. Bocico, ''Winter Best for Drawing Lower Bids," Engineering News-
Record (November 6, 1969), p. 86.
A
"The analysis of the historic relationship between competitors bids
and estimated direct costs might be done for each season.
5 For example, see D. Hertz, "Risk Analysis in Capital Investments,"
Harvard Business Review (January-February, 1964), pp. 95-106; R. Jaedicke
and A. RobichelSj "Cost -Volume -Profit Analysis Under Conditions of Un-
certainty," The Accounting Review (October, 1964), pp. 917-926.
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